The objective of this chapter is to describe the features of Hong Kong's venture capital system and make policy recommendations to improve its effectiveness as an institutional support for the establishment of new firms and the commercialization of new technologies as part of a larger objective of diversifying Hong Kong's industrial base and creating a base for future economic growth. To do this effectively, we must address venture capital (VC) as a "system" rather than the more limited sense of a category of investment capital or a segment of the finance industry. With this broader scope, we will show how the characteristics of specific types of actors and the formal and informal rules and norms by which they make decisions. As our analysis reveals, the current system has emerged from Hong Kong's particular historical, social, political and economic environment. While logical in this sense, it has not proven to be very supportive of new technology-based ventures.
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Hong Kong has the largest pool of venture capital and has been home to one of the largest number of funds in Asia since the mid-1990's ( Figure 1 ). In spite of this apparent huge pool of investment funds, however, its performance in terms of financing new technology-based firms in Hong Kong has been low. In their World Bank study, Martin, Han, and Tanaka (2007) described the VC industries in Taiwan and Israel as successful, but not Hong Kong. Indeed, we found that the conclusion of the MIT researchers in their 1997 government funded study Made by Hong Kong (1997) is just as apt today, more than ten years later. "While there is plenty of capital available in Hong Kong, it is striking how little of it is directed into start-up firms or into funding technological upgrades. In addition, surprisingly few institutional investors have such investments as a focus of their strategy" (p.293). While Hong Kong's finance industry as a whole has grown phenomenally since that time, much of this success is attributable to initial public offerings (IPOs) and investments at the expansion, mezzanine and buy-out stages, mostly in firms without a central technology focus.
The reasons for this situation can be traced to several features of the Hong Kong business environment; namely, a historically-rooted trading and arbitrage business mentality, the legacy of British banking practices, manufacturers' reliance on short-term loans, and the particular backgrounds of locally active VC investors. These have combined to create a short-term orientation towards investment. In stark contrast to the so-called "classic" model that emerged around Silicon Valley in the USA, venture capitalists in Hong Kong avoid early-stage investments and seldom nurture early-stage ventures that are commercializing new technologies.
Instead, they embrace a relatively short investment horizon and much lower risk threshold.
Although such proclivity is common among VCs in Asian countries (Kenny et al., 2007) , Hong
Kong's being a financial centre creates a subtle but powerful tendency for local VCs to see investments as financial "pure plays". In this regard, they are more like the VCs found in New York who also take a more purely financial approach to VC investing compared to the classic model. The recent technology and internet ("dot-com") The irony is that in recent years, the local supply of potentially commercializable technology has been increasing. Hong Kong has begun to see the fruits of years of significant government support of university-based research and support in the form incubation programs such as that in the Hong Kong Science Park. However, missing links and mismatched features of the institutional structure, investor cynicism towards technology investment, and a lack of mutual collaboration among key stakeholders (for example, between angel investors and the VC community) have obstructed the emergence of a new paradigm of technology-focused investing.
The state of early-stage investment on technology startups, by so-called angel investors or informal venture capital (Mason, 2006) , is a particularly weak link. The aftermath of these missing linkages may be summarized by the executive director of one international VC firm specializing in investments in technologies developed in universities, which opened its Hong Kong office in 2005, as follows:
The society is innovative and entrepreneurial. The Science Park is great in innovation…But there is not a cohesive financial arrangement, and entrepreneurs, academics, politicians and civil servants lack the appropriate skills to differentiate good ventures from bad. They have to mature in their decision-making to accept risk and how return is generated.
In the rest of this chapter, we first place venture capital more formally within a broader institutional framework and use an evolutionary approach (e.g., Murmann, 2003; North, 1990; Whitley, 1992) to trace its emergence and key contextual features that had an impact on its character. We can then understand the current status of investment in early-stage technology ventures, and will highlight the impact of the financial and industrial environment in general and the nature of angel investing in particular. This leads to a discussion of key factors that inhibit the function and performance of Hong Kong's VC system and our proposals for addressing these.
In brief, they include policy recommendations to increase the funds available for smaller but higher-risk investments (i.e., to cover the "equity gap" of new ventures); professionalize and diversify the skills of VC and private equity professionals; professionalize and formalize angel investors and associations; and provide more direct support for nurturing new ventures.
ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
At the center of the venture capital system is the business of venture capital. That is typically defined as private capital that is pooled from investors and managed by professionals ("venture capitalists") who invest in seed-or early-stage new firms that have a potential for annualized gains of 30-40% or more to compensate for the high failure rate of others in the investment portfolio of the funds. VCs usually realize the return on their investments ("exit") by selling the firm to another company ("trade sale") or after the firm is listed on the stock market (IPO). As this business model became successful it attracted massive funds, and has since evolved to include opportunities for pure financial plays, such as financing leveraged buyouts and technology joint ventures. Because of this increasingly purely financial approach to venture capital, some would consider it to be a specific type of private equity (PE), which invests in private but not publicly traded companies (Metrick, 2006) . Indeed, the use of private equity today resembles the traditional role that Wall Street financiers or English merchant banks played, using capital to organize and reorganize firms and industrial sectors. In Asia and Europe, the distinction between venture capital and private equity is less well defined than in the USA (Kenny, Han, & Tanaka, 2007) . The name of the local industrial association, Hong Kong
Venture Capital/ Private Equity Association, reflects this situation.
Because of sometimes important differences in terminology and practices, it is necessary to clarify what exactly is a "venture capital system" generically and then examine how it emerged and operates in a particular context. The approach of comparative business systems (Whitley, 1992; Murmann, 2003) and as applied to the specific case of studying venture capital and private equity in different national contexts (e.g., Bartzokas & Muni, 2004; Kenny et al., 2007; White et al, 2005) provides a useful means of structuring such an analysis. Here we adapt the system-level framework of White et al (2005) to the task of identifying key features and opportunities for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of Hong Kong's venture capital system ( Figure 3 ). This framework has three features. First, the venture capital system entails a fundamental set of activities that together support the commercialization of new technology.
Research across diverse contexts (e.g., Amit et al, 1998; Black & Gilson, 1998; Jeng & Wells, 2000; White, Gao & Zhang, 2005) suggest the following to be fundamental activities:
1. pooling funds 2. identifying investments 3. channeling funds 4. monitoring invested funds ("funds in-use"), and
appropriating returns to invested funds
Formal venture capital firms have institutionalized these into discrete steps (Figure 3 ), and these have become relatively standardized across national and regional contexts. As comparative research has found, however, there are important differences at a more micro-level of decision-making and investment management, which we will discuss further in the next sections focusing on Hong Kong's particular characteristics.
Second, the venture capital "system" is the configuration of institutionalized structuresactors and rules and processes-by which these fundamental activities are organized and integrated. The venture capital system, therefore, includes both the actors who undertake the focal activities of the system, as well as the regulations, practices and norms that have become established (or "institutionalized"). Relevant actors include angel investors, venture capital firms (both private as well as government-supported), and other types of investors. These actors have particular capabilities and preferences related to each of the focal activities. They also operate under formal regulations and informal industry norms.
Third, the system has emerged and evolved in response to Hong Kong's particular environment. Following White et al (2005) , we include in our analysis the relationship between Hong Kong's venture capital system and other institutionalized systems (education, legal, industry, etc.) , as well as the material and ideational logics that have an impact on the system's structure and dynamics ( Figure 4 ). Material logics are the economic or technological imperatives that also structure the choices of actors. These include the degree of competition, level of human capital, interest rates, and so forth. Ideational logics are the beliefs, assumptions and values that define the preferences and influence the choices of actors.
EVOLUTION OF HONG KONG'S VENTURE CAPITAL SYSTEM
In order to understand why Hong Kong's venture capital system has performed relatively poorly in terms of supporting the establishment of new technology-based firms, it is necessary to explore the historical context from which it emerged. To do this systematically, we apply the analytic framework introduced in the preceding section. We link the nature of the key actors, rules, practices and other features of the institutional environment to the impact on the establishment and support of new firms in Hong Kong.
Prior to the 1970s
Its geographic location, colonial development and control, and several historical events The colonial administration did not implement sophisticated governance in this natural resource-poor territory; essentially, it relied on a system in which co-opted local compradors dealt with the locals. Bankers and more sophisticated industrialists who had fled from Shanghai, rather than local industrialists from Southern China, were preferred for this role. This approach was in line with Britain's fundamentally non-interventionist doctrine vis-à-vis the territory, along with its mandate to maintain a balanced budget. This structure was fairly consistent over more than 100 years of colonial control, and it has left a major imprint on Hong Kong's society in general and administrative culture in particular. As basic policy, the government did not take any explicit developmental role towards industrial development or any specific industry. Requests for direct subsidy for a company, an industry or a sector were routinely dismissed. With the rise of the internet and dot-com bubble, many corporations in the "old economy" (infrastructure, real estate development, and logistics, in particular) tried to jump on the investment bandwagon. They set up corporate investment funds or entire subsidiaries to invest in technology and internet-related ventures. TOM.com and SunEvision, for example, were backed by large property companies and prominent business families. During this time, raising funds in the IPO market was very easy. While some of these established firms used the funds to develop new businesses that had synergies with their existing businesses, such as internet services for apartment dwellers, many of them also made eye-catching investments in unrelated 11 See Gutpa (2000) and Cheng (2004) .
start-ups. Similar and if not more so than other local venture capital funds, they had a short investment horizon and did not aim at making money through nurturing new firms.
to present
After the dot-com bust, many new VC firms established in the late 1990's suffered huge losses and became dormant or were closed. The corporate VC funds withdrew from investing in the "new" economy and returned to projects in the familiar "old" economy. The internet subsidiaries, such as SunEvision and China.com, were quickly consolidated. Apart from the rapid economic downturn, there were several reasons behind their dismal investment records:
1. Many new ventures rode on the internet frenzy and actually had little new technology, lacked creativity, and produced only "me-too" products. Most VCs interviewed suggested that there were not many high-quality investment opportunities for them. To them, Hong
Kong people seemed not unable to think out-of-the-box. there was a lack of qualified managers and entrepreneurs who could commercialize technology. There were (and still are) many senior managers who were outstanding in their own work, but they avoided risk and did not understand technology.
An experienced VC with a technology background commented, "VCs invest not in technology, but whether the team is able to build a business around the technology. Ideal teams must be intelligent in the sense that they can see complex [start-up] issues as a whole. They must also possess a high EQ because if they pursue a really large opportunity, they will need to overcome setbacks and frustration. Strong salesmanship is a character they also need in order to persuade people and get what they want."
"Availability of high power experienced international management with P&L experiences, sales background and strategic marketing background are much needed to scale companies," said C, "I also see the OEM mentality still persist, and good tech sold cheaply…not trying to maximize the value. SME is also not interested to go up the value chain for fear of losing control. Many of the tech products are me too with little differentiation nor innovation."
The Applied Research Fund of the government also suffered, and its loss of more than HK$240M drew public criticism. Apart from the above reasons that affected most funds, the outsourced funds under this scheme and the managing VC firms performed poorly because:
1. Governmental guidelines that might not make the best business sense tied the hands of the venture firms, including restrictions on investment targets and incentive structure. This puts Hong Kong second among high-income nations. The problem, however, is that most of the businesses in which they invested were not technology-based ventures. They were very small in investments (averaging $100,000), and belonged to friends or relatives. Thus, although the numbers suggest capital is available and some are willingness to invest, only a very small fraction of these informal investors (less than 1% of adult population) are "angels" who would invest in a "stranger's" venture.
14 We interviewed self-described angel investors, and found that they fall into five categories:
1. Sophisticated: They have entrepreneurial experience or professional backgrounds and manage a portfolio of ventures using the formal US model of angel investing. Some work with other angels informally, and some even form themselves into syndicates. Among them, the last two types of angels are unattractive to technology start-ups, unless they are exposed to more sophisticated angel investment techniques. Cooperation between them and entrepreneurs is usually difficult, as such angels leave insufficient incentives and autonomy to entrepreneurs. 
CURRENT STRUCTURE: ANALYSIS OF KEY ACTORS
This section describes each of the key actors that currently play an important role in the financing of the commercialization of new technology in Hong Kong. Their interrelationships and flows of resources amongst them are depicted in Figure 5 .
Government funds and agencies
The Innovative Technology Fund (ITF) was established in 1998 to provide funding to support technology start-ups and innovations in established corporations. We have already These industry developments, however, have not changed anything about the "brick" culture of local bankers. They remain quite traditional in their business practices. They almost always demand collateral (usually properties, letters of credit, or company shares) to support a loan for business investments. To lend working capital to a company, they will require the company to be profitable, and they will expect to examine two to three years of company records.
On top of this, they almost always request a personal guarantee, usually by shareholders. Even if the loan is guaranteed by the SME Fund of the government, the approval procedures and requirements are similar. Lending based on just a sound business plan is almost unheard of.
Institutional investors: Pension funds and university endowments
Pension funds in Hong Kong have grown to a significant size. According to the Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority, the government-mandated MPF had grown to over HK$220B in 2008 since being established in 2000. Other registered retirement schemes (OROS) totaled more than HK$250B during the same time. Their permissible investments are publicly traded equities, debts, warrants, and futures. Figure 6 shows the investment sources of VC funds in Hong Kong, China and Singapore. In the USA financial institutions provide only 18% of capital while endowments and foundations provide 17% (Metrick, 2007, p. 27) . In Asia, most funding is from corporations and insurance companies, then followed by banks.
Endowments and foundations do not play a significant role.
The US case suggests that university endowments could and should have more leeway in their choice of assets. 17 However, because Hong Kong universities are publicly funded, the government has guidelines that restrict such funds to be invested highly-rated asset classes (although warrants and options are inherently risky), and not in hedge funds and private equity funds. 18 Although funds that originally came to the endowment from private donations and programs for foreign students are not public money, these began to trickle in only after educational policies changed several years ago. The total amount is still small. 
Stock markets (Main Board and Growth Enterprise Market)
Stock markets in Asia-Pacific are considered to have higher systemic risk due to the nature of their national financial systems. Still, they have enjoyed a significant growth in IPOs and above-normal returns because new issues are often under-priced. Although new issues would 17 Morton Collins in the book Done Deals commented, "The investment objective of pension funds is not compatible with the high-risk, high-reward, early-stage, long-term, high-technology investing of the VCs. Pension funds have a target annual IRR, and are anxious to receive distributions of cash and securities." University endowment funds may have more compatible investment goals. "They are truly long-term investors and their goals are completely aligned with the old-style or "value" form of venture capital investing (p. 310)." 18 The Hong Kong Chinese University of Hong Kong, for example, has total net assets of HK$8.95B in 2007, about $6.1B of which is investment and $2.7B in cash and deposits. According to its 2007 Annual Report, "Taking a longer term view and in order to maximize capital appreciation, the University has formalized its investment strategy by redistributing about HK$851M into unit trusts, and invested HK$410M in the equity of a limited partnership" (p.10). This limited partnership investment (about 7% of total funds) should represent an alternative investment fund.
be overpriced during stock frenzies, that actually gives an even greater incentive for VCs to push their investees to go IPO.
Also, compared to IPOs in other markets, the original owners and founders of newlylisted firms in Hong Kong and other Asian markets retain a relatively high level of ownership and continue as management. In many cases, the objective of the IPO is not to sell out, nor to raise funds for growth, but for the firm to gain reputation. It also helps them bring in outsiders to improve management and governance. As Chinese enterprises increased the size, variety, and depth of financial activity in Hong
Kong, this in turn has drawn more institutional investors, hedge funds, private equity funds and private banks to Hong Kong. Their presence has stimulated the need for new services, financial innovations and sophisticated financial products. One result it that Hong Kong is now the most sophisticated derivatives market in Asia.
Another positive feedback from the large and sophisticated cluster of financial institutions has been to entice other types of companies to tap the Hong Kong market. The Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) was opened in November 1999 with the intention of addressing this situation. Its stated objective was "to provide capital formation for emerging companies to facilitate their business development and expansion," and was designed for firms with high growth potential but unable to meet the track record requirements of the main board.
GEM was established with the clear principles of "buyers beware" and "let the market decide."
Although GEM had moderate success before the dot.com bust (raising HK$45B in the first seven years), it now fails to attract technology firms, has lost much of its capitalization, and suffers from low liquidity. As shown in Figure On the other hand, politics and ideology must also be considered. Changes progress fitfully as the society and the government continue to struggle on whether Hong Kong can deviate from the positive non-interventionism doctrine. So when the government steps in, though intended to maintain fairness and accountability, micro-management and monitoring practices derived from a trader's mentality, cause actually more trouble. Any governmental attempts to take Hong Kong in a different tack are doomed to fail (Goodstadt, 2005) .
Venture Capital and Private Equity Firms
Most venture capitalists have accounting or finance backgrounds and adopt the attitude that "they are out to make money" rather than to nurture technology and new ventures that could have a major impact on an industry or even the world. For them, the easiest way is the best way to make money, and this leads VC and PE firms to favor late-stage, mezzanine and buyout deals.
These deals are more widely available in Hong Kong (rarely are there good technology startups) and less risky while larger in size, and do not use up as much of their time compared to earlystage deals. Indeed, not many VCs have the skills to build a company from scratch because they do not have relevant experience themselves. Furthermore, their finance background biases them to hire others like themselves rather than former entrepreneurs and operational professionals.
New Ventures
Many of Hong Kong's new firms are family businesses. These first-generation entrepreneurs are happy with the local market and business practices. They don't like transparency, guard their ownership very carefully, and tend to use insiders rather than professional managers (who were not available in the past). These characteristics are found broadly in society, and make it difficult for VCs to invest in and work with these firms.
Some second generation leaders of family businesses and the new generation of entrepreneurs are different. They have a world view and want to expand beyond the local environment. They are more receptive to being transparency and are more likely able to introduce outside professionals and capital. However, a small local market, high costs, lack of advanced technology, scarce start-up capital (see below for a deeper discussion on angel funding and SBIC-like companies 21 ), and a shortage of capable entrepreneurial teams make technology ventures more difficult to establish than non-tech ventures. In sum, although Hong Kong is famous for its entrepreneurial spirit, high-quality technology startups are rare. There is even a more general concern that Hong Kong's legendary entrepreneurial spirit is weakening and has been fading away.
Stock Markets
The Hong Kong Stock Exchange welcomes the listing of large corporations (especially those from the mainland) and has introduced more advanced financial products. These are the basis of its profits and attract large institutional investors, like pension funds, and investment banks. The technology level of potential listees is not an important criterion for them.
5.Banks and Institutional Funds (Pensions, Endowments)
Banks have a strong bias towards lending based on collateral rather than on the soundness of a business idea or the competency of a management team. They do not have the ability to assess and are quite reluctant to provide finance for start-ups and early-stage firms.
Retirement and endowment funds may invest as limited partners in VC or PE funds.
Although their investment horizon and objectives would seem to be in line with the classic VC model that nurtures early-stage ventures over a medium-to long-term horizon, their impact in Hong Kong has been minimal due to Hong Kong's version of the "prudent man" rule. 22 As a result, money goes into and breeds ever larger and more expansion and buyout funds. To nurture more technology start-up, the abundant capital "parked" in Hong Kong needs redirection. 22 The rapid growth of the VC industry in recent decades was attributed to several related events (Gompers & Lerner, 2000, p. 8-10) , one being which the removal of the "prudent man" rule in 1979. It unleashed pension funds to invest in VCs; investment advisors (gatekeepers) also arose to advise and facilitate pension funds to invest.
6.Angels and Angel Groups
The traditional way to finance new ventures is savings and family capital, in addition to partnerships with friends and coworkers. Those in Hong Kong, however, tend not to organize themselves into syndicates, and there is a lack of institutional support and understanding of angel investing. For the small group of cashed-out or retired local technology entrepreneurs, they find few companions to co-invest in Hong Kong and instead focus their efforts on the mainland. As a result, they do not fill the 'equity gap' faced by technology entrepreneurs in Hong Kong.
OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE PERFORMANCE OF HONG KONG'S VENTURE CAPITAL SYSTEM
Bearing in mind limitations in overhauling fundamental institutional structures and beliefs, such as willingness and legitimacy of the government to make major ideological changes, high costs, cynicism towards investment in new technology, and a short-term orientation among the society, we propose the following policy options as feasible for implementing in the medium term. Due to the inter-relatedness of these elements, they shall be more effective if implemented in a concerted effort.
1. Stimulate more VC funds with a longer time horizon and greater focus on new technology commercialization. One way is to encourage long-term investors to become limited partners of VC funds.
The government should channel university endowment funds and other government funds to VC funds since their longer time horizons are compatible. This should also attract more foreign funds and at the same time reinforce Hong Kong's position as a financial hub. One option is to invest a small amount of governmental reserves (say 0.05%) as a legitimizing gesture and thereby encourage the endowment funds (estimated to be over $50B) to follow suit (say 0.5%).
The implicit "prudent man" rule could be lifted for MPF and other retirement funds, allowing them to invest a portion of such funds in non-publicly traded investment funds. PE funds may be more suitable given the investment objectives of retirement funds. A mere 1-2% of these funds (total HK$600B) would amount to over $10B and bolster the outlook of many local VC/PE funds, at the same time keeping investment talent in Hong Kong.
ARF was reviewed and many lessons learnt after its closure five years ago. Israel's Inbal program was a failure but lessons learned led to the hugely successful Yozma program.
Politics aside, the government may learning from these experiences and sponsor investors to giving full autonomy to the VC companies on investment decisions; and providing strong incentive on the 'Upside' for the funded companies (i.e., the possibility of within a median period, of purchasing government's share at about cost), but no downside "guarantee" of losses.
to other angels and entrepreneurs. Also, it ensures that only informed investors are involved in risky angel investment. The proven system in UK shall be implemented in Hong Kong. Basically individuals can self-certify to the government if (1) they have high earnings (say HK$1.5 M) or own valuable net assets (say HK$5M), and (2) possess experience as a sophisticated investor in private companies, such as being an experienced member of an angel network, sat on the board of or serve as professionals for private companies, and having experiences in running or investing in these companies. Presenting false statement is against the law.
Some of the tax incentives EIS used to encourage angels to invest in private companies can be adopted even though Hong Kong has no capital gain tax. These include a tax relief at the basic rate and income tax relief on losses. The Enterprise Capital Funds of the UK was modeled on the US experience and has been viewed as successful since 2002 (Mason, 2006) . A similar program shall be implemented in Hong Kong. In essence the government will solicit competitive bids from qualified individuals (or companies) for plans to invest in small private companies (range HK$1M to $15M). The government will match up to twice the amount raised by the bidder to form a fund, but will take a smaller share of the profits and an equal share of the losses. The investment period must be longer than 2 years. More careful study can define the maximum size of the government's match fund, the business nature, and technology content of the invested companies.
The Startup enterprise Development Scheme (SEEDS) and Venture Investment Support for Start-ups (VISS) programs in Singapore require direct government involvement in making and monitoring decisions (Wang, 2004) . They may not be as feasible in Hong Kong due to different administrative tradition and lack of qualified people in the government.
5. Diversify the backgrounds of the general partners of VC firms.
Encourage the VC/PE firms to recruit special partners who are retired or cashed-out entrepreneurs to complement the jobs of general partners who tend to have an accounting or financial background. If advisors are more widely available, governmental and endowment funds may be stipulated to be invested only in firms with partners fitting this profile.
With more active and organized angel groups, the inter-flow of talents between VC firms diversify the backgrounds of the general partners.
6. Create new IPO exit routes for VC and PE invested in technology firms.
It's almost a lost cause to change the HKSE which monopolizes company listings and stock trading. 26 One possible future exit lies in setting up a new board with perhaps the main board or the SME board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Otherwise, IPO's in other markets like NASDAQ and other exit routes will continue to be the preferred choices. An efficient exit route would encourage VC investment in the long-run and help Hong Kong to maintain itself as a financial centre. 
